| 15 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | Falsifier. The minimum wage increase comes in below 25%, the December survey's end-2027 expectation drops below 22%, or January CPI, released in early February, comes in below 3%. |
| 15 November 2026 | Scenario | %50 | Still open | H1 · 50% — Indexation passes through to prices in January. The minimum wage rises by around 30% and January CPI comes in at 3.5–4%; the 2027 expectation stays at 23–24% and the CBRT slows its cuts in the first quarter. |
| 15 November 2026 | Scenario | %20 | Still open | H3 · 20% — Wages, the lira and oil deteriorate together. The minimum wage rises by more than 35%, Brent passes 100 dollars and the dollar 52 lira; CDS climbs towards 300 and the far end of the curve approaches the policy rate. |
| 15 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Threshold: if the lira moves past the year-end expectation of 51.61 to 52, the currency channel adds to January indexation and the 2027 expectation shifts upwards. |
| 15 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Threshold: if Türkiye's 5-year CDS exceeds 300 basis points, the drift in the expectations anchor has spilled into the sovereign risk premium. |
| 15 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Threshold: if Brent futures exceed 100 dollars, they also surpass the oil assumption the CBRT raised on 12 November, adding the second constraint to the first. |
| 15 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | Falsifier. The French vehicle is set up with an escort or transit guarantee and the premium falls below 5% within 4–6 weeks. Alternatively, falling rates erode leveraged catastrophe returns and push new capital into specialty lines. |
| 15 November 2026 | Scenario | %55 | Still open | H1 · 55% — A sticky premium and a public vehicle in limbo. France–Gulf talks drag on through the winter and attacks continue weekly; the premium stays in a 5–9% band and the public vehicle does not come into play. |
| 15 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — An escorted public vehicle. The French vehicle is announced with European naval escort and transits increase; private premiums fall below 5% and the public vehicle actually writes policies. |
| 15 November 2026 | Scenario | %15 | Still open | H3 · 15% — Escalation and a narrowing gate. Mine and missile attacks intensify and a major tanker is lost; the premium rises above 10% and Brent futures exceed 100 dollars. |
| 15 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Threshold: a doubling of daily transits from the November average would show the security constraint easing and the premium starting to fall. |
| 15 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Threshold: if Gulf attacks push the insurance premium back to 10%, Brent futures breaking 100 dollars would show premium costs passing through to delivered prices. |
| 15 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Confirmed | Premise of the chain: high rates generate returns on collateral assets, and new capital flows into uncorrelated property catastrophe risk rather than the highly correlated war line. |
| 15 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Partly borne out | Link 2 of the chain: shipowners pass a 7–9% premium through to freight and delivered prices, making deliveries such as LNG from Qatar to Europe more expensive. To watch: Qatari LNG deliveries and EU gas storage levels. |
| 13 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | Falsifier: the reading fails if independent AIS counts exceed half of pre-war daily levels for two weeks running and Brent futures close below 87 dollars by the end of November. |
| 13 November 2026 | Scenario | %50 | Partly borne out | H1 · 50% — The transit bottleneck persists. Independent counts stay low, the US blockade and intermittent tanker attacks continue; Brent stays above the 86.7 dollar assumption and the CBRT slows its December cut. |
| 13 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — Transit normalises. Independent counts exceed half of pre-war levels for two weeks, attacks stop and OPEC+ raises its targets on 29 November. |
| 13 November 2026 | Scenario | %20 | Partly borne out | H3 · 20% — Renewed escalation. Tanker attacks intensify and Washington decides on new strikes, or an attack lands in a Black Sea coastal state's territorial waters; Brent tops 100 dollars. |
| 13 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Partly borne out | The one thing to watch: the independent AIS transit count in Hormuz. Unless it approaches half of pre-war levels, the OPEC+ recovery will not feed through to prices. |
| 12 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | Falsifier: if capacity also expands and prices fall in data centre outage cover and the political violence line at the 1 January 2027 renewals, the reading weakens. It also weakens if CMA CGM withdraws its Black Sea surcharge before 1 December. |
| 12 November 2026 | Scenario | %55 | Partly borne out | H1 · 55% — The two-tier pricing persists. Renewals confirm declines in the property and war layers, outage and political violence cover stays narrow, and the Black Sea coastal strip stays calm. |
| 12 November 2026 | Scenario | %25 | Falsified | H2 · 25% — Abundance spreads beyond standard cover. Reinsurers open capacity in outage products, CMA CGM withdraws the surcharge, and there is no new heavy loss in the Gulf. |
| 12 November 2026 | Scenario | %20 | Partly borne out | H3 · 20% — Losses turn pricing. The Gulf loss file exceeds 2.5 billion dollars or an attack lands in a Black Sea coastal state's territorial waters; premiums jump and the Joint War Committee widens its list. |
| 12 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Partly borne out | The one thing to watch: the Joint War Committee map that keeps four Black Sea coastal states' territorial waters off the war list. If an attack lands in that strip and the list widens, premiums and surcharges on ships calling at Turkish ports rise in the same week. |
| 11 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | Falsifier: the reading weakens if Marsh or the major brokers quote the Hormuz tanker war premium below 3% of hull value in December. It also weakens if JMIC's weekly count of new incidents falls to zero for two consecutive weeks. |
| 11 November 2026 | Scenario | %50 | Partly borne out | H1 · 50% — Cheap oil, risk intact. The supply glut persists, weekly attacks in Hormuz continue and the Qatar formula is never put in writing. Brent futures hold around 90 dollars, while the war premium and freight keep delivered costs high. |
| 11 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — The Qatar formula is put in writing. Iran's two-day implementation proposal is tied to a written arrangement with the US, attack frequency drops for two weeks, Brent falls below 88 dollars and the war premium eases. |
| 11 November 2026 | Scenario | %20 | Partly borne out | H3 · 20% — Renewed escalation. A confirmed hit on the East-West pipeline or a loading jetty halts flows for days, or the US resumes strikes; Brent rises above 100 dollars. |
| 11 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Threshold: January Brent falling below 88 dollars would show the supply glut has fully overridden war risk; a return above 100 dollars would show physical disruption in the Gulf being priced in again. |
| 11 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Threshold: daily Hormuz transits rising durably above 40 ships would signal that attack risk is also receding in the policy wording. |
| 11 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Partly borne out | Chain, link 1: futures fall while the war premium and freight stay put, so insurance and freight take a larger share of the delivered cost of Gulf-loaded cargo. |
| 11 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Partly borne out | Chain, link 2: Asian refiners turn to Atlantic barrels with lower delivered costs, and Gulf sellers deepen discounts in their January official selling prices to defend volume. |
| 11 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Confirmed | Two conditions together would break the chain: the indirect share at the 30-year auction returns above 70%, and producer prices on 13 November come in below expectations. Foreign retreat at the 10 November auction would then remain a one-off deviation. |
| 11 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Confirmed | Chain, link 1: the indirect share also stays low at the 25 billion dollar 30-year auction on 12 November, and the sale tails. The far end of the curve reprices on its buyer base. |
| 11 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Partly borne out | Threshold: if the 10-year yield settles durably above 5.02%, the rise in the term premium is being priced independently of the Fed decision. |
| 11 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Confirmed | Threshold: if the 30-year yield exceeds 5.40% after the 12 November auction, the retreat in foreign demand has spread across the whole far end of the curve. |
| 11 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Confirmed | Threshold: if the dollar index rises from 102.25 to above 103, expectations of a Fed hike will be transmitted to emerging markets through the currency channel. |
| 11 November 2026 | Scenario | %65 | Still open | H1 · 65% — 25 basis points with a signal of a higher path. Producer prices and mid-November data come in moderate; the Fed hikes by 25 basis points on 9 December and keeps the door open to a further hike in 2027. |
| 11 November 2026 | Scenario | %20 | Still open | H2 · 20% — A 50 basis point credibility move. Producer prices also run hot, the 30-year auction stays weak and support for Waller's line broadens on the committee; the Fed hikes by 50 basis points. |
| 11 November 2026 | Scenario | %15 | Still open | H3 · 15% — The Fed holds. The tech sell-off deepens, weekly jobless claims rise markedly and easing energy prices feed into leading price indicators; the committee leaves rates unchanged in December. |
| 11 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Confirmed | The one thing to watch: the US 30-year auction at 21:00 on 12 November. An indirect bidder share below 70% would confirm that foreign demand is pulling back and that the term premium is widening independently of the Fed decision. |
| 11 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Partly borne out | Falsifier: an extension of the US–China suspensions to 12 months at APEC in Shenzhen, together with an indirect bidder share back above 70% at the 12 November 30-year auction, would refute the 'easing on lease' reading. |
| 11 November 2026 | Scenario | %50 | Partly borne out | H1 · 50% — Easing on lease continues: the suspensions are renewed for a short term, the Fed hikes by 25 basis points in December and Brent stays at 85–95 dollars. |
| 11 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — Terms lengthen and easing becomes durable: the suspensions are extended to 12 months, foreign demand returns at the 30-year auction and Hormuz traffic exceeds half of pre-war levels. |
| 9 November 2026 | Scenario | %55 | Still open | H1 · 55% — Talks open, skies open: the Abu Dhabi round ends with a new schedule of talks but no ceasefire; strikes on the grid and bridges continue through the winter. |
| 9 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Falsified | H2 · 30% — A narrow infrastructure ceasefire: the sides agree a limited ceasefire, similar to the Oleshky model, covering energy facilities and possibly ports. |
| 9 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Partly borne out | Second link: grid damage pushes Kyiv to prioritise a narrow energy and infrastructure ceasefire in Abu Dhabi and later rounds; Moscow tries to tie this to other concessions. |
| 9 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Partly borne out | Third link: if an infrastructure ceasefire excludes ports, port strikes keep the insurance cost of Black Sea trade high; the indicators to watch are the war-risk premium and daily Bosphorus transits. |
| 9 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Threshold: January ICE Brent above 105 dollars would increase US pressure over strikes on Russian refineries and narrow Kyiv's logistical leverage. |
| 9 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | Breaking condition: if the mid-November Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting yields new Patriot systems or interceptor deliveries, the interception rate rises and the chain breaks at the first step. |
| 9 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Partly borne out | Primary indicator: if US October CPI at 16:30 on 10 November beats the 0.3% monthly forecast, a December hike is locked in and the term premium reopens at that evening's $42 billion 10-year auction. |
| 9 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Falsified | The fastest channel to react to a hot US CPI will be emerging-market currencies and Türkiye's external financing costs. |
| 9 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Partly borne out | Secondary indicator: whether the 10–11 November Abu Dhabi round produces an energy infrastructure ceasefire clause will determine whether the Black Sea war premium drops out of its 0.6–1% band. |
| 9 November 2026 | Scenario | %50 | Still open | H1 · 50% — Prices ease, risk shifts to the public sector: Brent stays at $90–100 and Gulf political violence capacity is stuck at $200–400 million. |
| 9 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — The gap closes in price's favour: a Washington–Tehran framework reopens Hormuz, the tanker war premium falls below 2% and Brent drops below $90. |
| 9 November 2026 | Scenario | %20 | Still open | H3 · 20% — The gap closes against price: an onshore Gulf facility is heavily damaged, or October CPI locks the Fed into a December hike and the dollar jumps; Brent tops $100 and CDS premiums widen. |
| 9 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | Falsifier for the combined signal: an increase in war and political violence retrocession capacity at the 1 January 2027 renewal, or Gulf political violence capacity returning above $500 million, would falsify the reading. |
| 8 November 2026 | Scenario | %50 | Still open | H1 · 50% — Land crossings narrow, Iraqi volumes hold: Iraq closes several crossings, sanctions hit Caspian traffic and there is no major wave of attacks in Hormuz; Iraqi exports stay at 3–3.4 million barrels a day, but conditions harden. |
| 8 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — A Qatari formula loosens the blockade: the US accepts a step towards lifting the blockade, Iran grants IAEA access and opens Hormuz under an interim arrangement; benchmark oil falls below 90 dollars. |
| 8 November 2026 | Scenario | %20 | Still open | H3 · 20% — Fighting resumes: the US restarts major operations before January and Iran retaliates against Gulf infrastructure; Basra loadings fall and benchmark oil rises above 110 dollars. |
| 8 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Thresholds: January Brent above 110 dollars means a fresh Gulf outage is being priced, below 90 dollars an easing of the blockade; daily Hormuz transits below 20 mean shipowners are pulling out of Basra. |
| 8 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Partly borne out | Step 1 (weeks): Baghdad closes more crossings or tightens controls; Iran's western border trade is squeezed into a handful of points and tension rises with Iran-aligned Iraqi groups. |
| 8 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Partly borne out | Step 2 (weeks): Tehran tightens control in Hormuz, incidents in the strait multiply and the Gulf war risk premium holds in the 6–10% band or rises; buyers ask Iraq for delivery outside the strait. |
| 8 November 2026 | Causal chain | — | Still open | Step 3 (months): To protect revenue, Iraq leans on its own tankers and the Ceyhan line; Ceyhan loadings rise and Türkiye's transit income reflects the shift. |
| 8 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | Breaking condition: if Qatari mediation secures an easing of the blockade and an interim reopening of Hormuz, pressure on the land crossings loses its point and the chain breaks at the first step. |
| 6 November 2026 | Scenario | %50 | Still open | H1 · 50% — Prices swing, buffers erode: Brent oscillates in a $90–105 band, the Gulf war premium stays at 6–10%, and the Yanbu outlet is threatened but stays open. |
| 6 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — A political framework replenishes buffers: the war premium falls below 2%, transits rise and Egypt recalls its deferred cargoes. |
| 6 November 2026 | Scenario | %20 | Still open | H3 · 20% — Buffers break: the Yanbu outlet is hit or Türkiye's net reserves excluding swaps fall below $20 billion; Brent returns to its $113 peak. |
| 6 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Primary indicator: if CBRT weekly data on 12 November show net reserves excluding swaps falling from $24.3 billion to below $20 billion, the currency anchor's capacity to carry the energy bill reaches its limit. |
| 6 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | Confluence falsifier: a rise in net reserves excluding swaps on 12 November, Egypt recalling its deferred cargoes and the Gulf war premium falling below 2% would disprove the reading. |
| 5 November 2026 | Scenario | %55 | Still open | H1 · 55% — Prices fall, the strait stays shut: Iran does not narrow its blacklist, daily transits stay at 3–7 ships, the war-risk premium holds in the 6–10% band, and part of the drop to 94.62 dollars is recovered within weeks. |
| 5 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — Political framework, gradual reopening: the new balance in Washington speeds up framework talks with Iran, the blacklist narrows and transits with tracking signals on return to double digits. |
| 5 November 2026 | Scenario | %15 | Still open | H3 · 15% — The list turns into seizures: Iran seizes one of the listed Gulf state tankers or stops vessels conducting ship-to-ship transfers; January Brent returns above 100 dollars. |
| 5 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Primary indicator: if January Brent falls below 90 dollars while transits stay at 3–7 ships, the market is treating the constraint as overcome before we do. |
| 5 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Secondary indicator: the US affiliates rule and China's rare earth suspensions on 10 November; if no notice is published, access shifts from a contractual term to a formal restriction. |
| 5 November 2026 | Falsifier | — | Still open | Falsifier for the converging-signals reading: the reading weakens if the US and Chinese suspensions are extended by notice on 10 November, if the ex-China price of yttrium halves by the end of December, or if daily transits with tracking signals on return to double digits in Hormuz. |
| 5 November 2026 | Scenario | %50 | Still open | H1 · 50% — The dark corridor persists: the blockade and the PGSA list stay in place, transits with tracking signals on stay below 10 a day, and Gulf exports hold in the 15–18 million barrels a day band. |
| 5 November 2026 | Scenario | %30 | Still open | H2 · 30% — Deal and gradual reopening: the US and Iran reach an interim deal easing the blockade and sanctions, the PGSA list is suspended, and premiums fall with a lag as insurers wait for an incident-free period. |
| 5 November 2026 | Scenario | %20 | Still open | H3 · 20% — The list cuts the transfer chain: the PGSA lists foreign tankers conducting transfers and seizes one, or an attack occurs; Gulf exports fall below 15 million barrels a day. |
| 5 November 2026 | Watched indicator | — | Still open | Threshold: if January Brent falls below 90 dollars while the blacklist grows, futures prices have decoupled from the delivery constraint. |