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HighI Geo-Economics & Chokepoints22 September 2026, Tuesday

Ukraine strikes the Kuibyshev and Ufa refineries: more than 45% of Russian refining capacity is out of service

On the night of 21-22 September the Kuibyshev refinery in Samara, with capacity of 7 million tonnes a year, and Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim in Bashkortostan, with 7.5 million tonnes a year, were struck. Ukraine's General Staff said more than 45% of design capacity was out of service as of 21 September.

UFA

According to a report published by Ukrainska Pravda at 11.00 on 22 September, the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Special Operations Forces confirmed that two large refineries had been struck on the night of 21-22 September. The Kuibyshev refinery in Samara, part of the Rosneft structure, has an annual capacity of roughly 7 million tonnes and produces more than 30 petroleum products including petrol, diesel and fuel oil. The Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim plant in Bashkortostan has a capacity of about 7.5 million tonnes a year and produces petrol, diesel, boiler fuel, liquefied gas and sulphur. Fires were reported at both sites. The Ukrainian side stated that the products of both refineries serve the needs of the Russian military. No Russian official statement on the damage was available at the time this record was written.

According to an Interfax-Ukraine report dated 21 September, Ukraine's General Staff announced that, following the attack on the Moscow Refinery, more than 45% of the design capacity of Russia's oil refining industry was out of service as of 21 September 2026. The same statement listed the sites struck between 14 and 20 September: the AVT-6 primary unit and tank farm at the Syzran refinery in the Samara region, the AVT-3 unit at the Slavneft-YANOS refinery in Yaroslavl, with capacity of about 15 million tonnes a year, the Atlant Aero plant in Taganrog in the Rostov region, and the Gazprom Neft Moscow Refinery. The General Staff also reported a shortage of quality fuel in Russia and a sharp fall in production of Euro-5/K5 grade petrol and diesel. A Kyiv Independent compilation dated 21 September carries the same 45% figure. Ukraine's General Staff is a party to the conflict and this ratio could not be independently verified.

The macroeconomic reflection of the disruption is visible in Russian monetary policy texts. The Bank of Russia held its policy rate at 14.00% on 11 September 2026; the same text stated that annual inflation stood at 6.3% as of 7 September, that the rise in fuel prices was affecting core inflation dynamics, and that price pressure stemmed from a temporary narrowing of production capacity in some sectors. In other words, the loss of refining capacity is no longer merely a war statistic but an inflation item written into the reasoning of a rate decision.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

Ukraine's target is no longer individual plants but the total capacity of Russia's refining system; the sum of the sites struck between 14 and 22 September makes that plain. Although the 45% out-of-service ratio is a partisan statement, the central bank writing capacity narrowing into its inflation reasoning confirms that the loss is felt at the macro level. The most likely direction is continued export restrictions to protect domestic supply and fuel inflation staying elevated.

Likely effects

  • Russia's domestic fuel marketNegativeWeeks

    A sharp fall in output of Euro-5/K5 petrol and diesel entrenches regional rationing; two more plants with 14.5 million tonnes a year of capacity going out of service widens the gap.

  • Russian inflation and ratesNegative1–6 months

    In holding the rate at 14.00% on 11 September the central bank pointed to capacity narrowing as a source of price pressure; annual inflation stood at 6.3% as of 7 September. The window for rate cuts is closing.

  • Global product marketsNegative1–6 months

    A narrower pool of exportable Russian diesel and petrol pushes refined product margins higher rather than crude; crude exports may in fact rise as domestic demand falls.

  • Türkiye's fuel importsNegative1–6 months

    Türkiye leans on Russian product for its diesel imports; 45% of Russian refining capacity being out of service pushes up both the search for alternative sources and the cost of imported product.

Possibilities, ranked

  1. 1
    Capacity losses persist and curbs are extended55%

    Repairs cannot keep pace with the tempo of attacks; fuel export restrictions stay in force to the end of the year and rationing spreads.

    Watch: The fuel export ban being extended beyond 31 October or widened to cover petrol as well.

  2. 2
    Partial recovery30%

    Some of the units struck are brought back within weeks, the out-of-service ratio falls below 45% and fuel inflation slows.

    Watch: Recovery reported in official Russian refining throughput data or in Euro-5 production.

  3. 3
    A shift towards crude exports15%

    Crude that cannot be processed is diverted to export; the product gap widens while Russia's crude loading volumes rise markedly.

    Watch: Upward revisions to crude loading programmes at Baltic and Black Sea ports.

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Market reaction

Indicators affected

  • Refining capacity out of service 45%
  • Capacity of the two sites struck 14.5m tonnes/year
  • Russian annual inflation 6.3%

Sources

  1. Ukrainska Pravda — Ukrainian forces strike two large refineries in Samara and Ufa
  2. Interfax-Ukraine — Ukraine has knocked out more than 45% of Russian refining capacity
  3. Kyiv Independent — Russia's oil refining capacity falls as damage from Moscow strikes sets in
  4. Bank of Russia — Key rate held at 14.00%