Skip to content
Aerial panorama of the Singapore Strait and the Pasir Panjang container terminal

I Geo-Economics & ChokepointsAsia-Pacific

Shanghai researcher calls Shenzhen trilateral a nuclear and energy bargain, not Yalta

Singapore Strait and Pasir Panjang Port Terminal (2016)Photo: Bob Tan / Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0 · resized · Source
Institution
Global Times (Chinese state media) — China National Institute for SCO International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation
Author
Cui Heng
Country · language
China · English
Affiliation
State media, opinion page

Summary

Cui Heng is a researcher at the Shanghai-based China National Institute for SCO International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation. He wrote in the Chinese state outlet Global Times on 18 November, a day before the trilateral meeting of Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump in Shenzhen. Western media were calling the meeting a second Yalta. Cui rejects the comparison. In 1945, spheres of influence were accepted as the post-war order. Today the spillover from great-power conflict reaches much further.

In the author's view, the summit's purpose is not to divide up territory but to offer common security as a public good. The three countries were victors of the Second World War, founders of the UN and are permanent members of the Security Council. Cui wants severed military communication channels reopened. He proposes clearer red lines and rules on bringing artificial intelligence into nuclear command systems. In his view, most great-power risks arise from broken dialogue and misread signals.

The third rationale is energy. The Ukraine crisis is nearing its fifth year, and conflict has flared again in the Middle East. The author writes that even a minor disruption in Hormuz could send oil prices soaring. Russia is a major energy exporter and the US one of the largest producers. China is the largest exporter of new energy equipment and a key importer. According to Cui, the trilateral format opens a direct channel to Moscow, which has been constrained in some multilateral forums since the Ukraine crisis. That channel covers nuclear arms control, crisis management and energy exports. The summit's lasting significance depends on a shared risk assessment and on follow-up negotiations.

Blind spot

The piece was written before the summit and published under Global Times' partnership with RT; it carries the framing of two state media outlets. It never mentions trade, tariffs, export controls or Taiwan. It leaves the energy rationale without figures and does not quantify the price impact of a Hormuz disruption. It does not discuss the objection that Europe and Ukraine are absent from the table.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

Cui's reading shows Beijing wants to present the summit as a risk-management platform rather than a carve-up of power. The concrete agenda is military communication, rules on AI and nuclear command, and energy flows. The piece ties its measure of success to follow-up negotiations. The most likely path is agreement in principle followed by a slow-moving technical timetable.

Likely effects

  • Energy flowsUncertainWeeks

    A major exporter, a major producer and a key importer are discussing energy flows at the same table. It is a search for a political buffer against Hormuz-driven price spikes; without a concrete mechanism its effect will be limited.

  • European securityNegative1–6 months

    Russia gaining a direct channel to Washington on nuclear and energy issues could shrink the bargaining power of Europe, which is absent from the table on Ukraine.

  • TürkiyeUncertain1–6 months

    If energy and maritime security move to a great-power trilateral table, Türkiye's mediating role in the Black Sea and the Middle East faces a rival format.

Possibilities, ranked

  1. 1
    Agreement in principle, slow follow-up55%

    The parties announce general principles on nuclear risk and energy flows, while technical work yields nothing concrete for months.

    Watch: An official announcement of a trilateral military hotline or a working group on AI and nuclear command

  2. 2
    Format becomes institutionalised25%

    The trilateral becomes regular and time-bound negotiations begin on energy and arms control.

    Watch: A date announced for a second trilateral summit

  3. 3
    Format falls apart20%

    Escalation on the Ukrainian or Iranian front renders the trilateral table ineffective.

    Watch: Washington announcing a new sanctions package against Russia

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: globaltimes.cn · 18 November 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.