What they did
Ahead of the summit on 24 September it turned the agenda towards Taiwan: Xi Jinping is reported to be preparing to ask, on the basis of the third joint communiqué of 1982, that the United States halt arms sales to Taiwan. The suspended arms package is worth 14 billion dollars and the package approved in December 2025 is worth 11 billion dollars. On sovereign risk, by contrast, it did not move with the bloc: its five-year risk premium rose from 34.05 basis points on 18 September to 34.35 on 21 September, an increase of only 0.9%.
Why
Framing the summit around a single demand keeps any concessions on the trade and technology files open to bargaining in the shadow of that demand. Resting the demand on the 1982 communiqué also places it on legal ground, anchored in a text the United States signed itself. The decoupling of the risk premium from the bloc's move shows that China's capital-account regime keeps it outside the emerging-market pricing basket.
What they must do
It has to keep pressing the Taiwan demand without making it the summit's only subject; otherwise it risks leaving the table with nothing to show on trade. At the same time it must manage the loss of market created by Mexico's tariffs of up to 50% on countries with no free trade agreement and by its pledge, at the USMCA table, to curb imports from China.
What comes next
The Xi–Trump summit on 24 September and whether any text on arms sales emerges from the meeting. The Washington–Mexico negotiating round on 28 September is the second threshold for China's position in the North American market.
Preference
A phased halt to arms sales to Taiwan and tariff relief on the trade file; a risk premium that continues to decouple from the emerging-market basket.
Observed behaviour
A stance that frames the summit around a single legal anchor while keeping the economic front quiet: the demand is voiced loudly, the cost carried silently.
Sources
Related events
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