III Kinetic Conflicts & DefenceMiddle East and North Africa
The Gulf caught between two straits: Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb as a single front
- Institution
- Middle East Council on Global Affairs
- Author
- Khalid Al-Jaber
- Country · language
- Qatar · English
- Affiliation
- Doha-based independent institution
Summary
According to Al-Jaber, by seizing Mocha, Dhubab and Perim Island under the direction of the Revolutionary Guards, the Houthis have turned from an insurgent movement in Yemen into a strategic actor able to threaten Bab el-Mandeb directly. The author argues that Iran uses the two straits not as separate fronts but as a single maritime space that squeezes the world economy from east and west at the same time.
The data he cites supports this thesis: oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz fell from 20.9 million barrels a day in the first half of 2025 to 4.9 million barrels a day in the second quarter of 2026; over the same period, flows through Bab el-Mandeb rose from 4.2 million to 8.1 million barrels a day. The increase is due to Saudi exports being shifted to the Red Sea side. The escape route itself thus becomes the new target. Al-Jaber concludes that the US should pursue an integrated strategy treating the Red Sea and the Gulf as a single theatre of operations. The second-quarter 2026 flow figures are as reported by the author and could not be independently verified.
Blind spot
What the West misses: the closure of Hormuz has made the Red Sea route not safer but more critical and more vulnerable; the backup route and the main route lie within range of the same adversary. Weakness of this reading: it reduces the Houthis' internal dynamics to Iranian direction and does not discuss Qatar's mediating role.
Talay assessment
Bottom line
The author's reading of the two straits as a single front is persuasive and is being borne out on the ground: the Houthis have seized Mocha, Perim and Hanish, the Saudi–Houthi ceasefire has effectively collapsed, and drones launched from Iraq shut the East-West pipeline that carries exports to the Red Sea. The escape route has indeed become a target. The weak points are reducing the Houthis to an extension of Iran and not discussing Qatar's mediating role; the 2026 flow figures are also unverified. The integrated strategy he proposes is hard to achieve soon given the selective US posture; the most likely path is prolonged pressure on both straits.
Likely effects
- Saudi export routeNegativeWeeks
Saudi exports diverted to the Red Sea side are now within range of Houthi coastal and island positions; insurance and freight costs and the supply security of buyers in Asia and Europe are directly affected.
- Displacement in YemenNegativeWeeks
Fighting around Mocha displaced about 46,000 people; at least 125,000 people have fled their homes in the past two weeks and Djibouti has asked for international assistance.
- Gulf security architectureUncertain1–6 months
Houthi attacks are the first serious test of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. If Pakistan's statements do not turn into concrete steps the pact loses deterrence; if they do, the conflict regionalises.
- TürkiyeNegative1–6 months
As a party to the Mecca agreement, Türkiye faces expectations of commitment in the Saudi–Houthi conflict; risk along the Red Sea and Suez route also raises the cost and duration of trade with Asia.
Possibilities, ranked
- 1Pressure on both straits persists65%
The Houthis hold the coast and islands and transit through Hormuz remains limited; attacks continue intermittently and both outlets for Gulf exports stay at risk.
Watch: Reports of attacks on merchant ships in the Bab el-Mandeb; status of Yanbu loadings
- 2Partial de-escalation through mediation20%
Through Omani and Qatari channels the Saudi–Houthi ceasefire is restored and a temporary Hormuz corridor takes effect; the positions gained by the Houthis remain bargaining chips.
Watch: A renewed Saudi–Houthi ceasefire announcement; the Salalah meeting taking place
- 3Military counter-move on the coast and islands15%
Yemeni government forces, with regional support, move to retake Mocha and the islands; maritime risk rises in the near term, and if successful pressure on the Bab el-Mandeb eases.
Watch: Land or amphibious operations around Mocha and Perim; deployment of additional naval assets to the Red Sea
Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.
Original publication: mecouncil.org · 13 September 2026
This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.