III Kinetic Conflicts & Defence Americas

The view from Beijing: the US has no exit plan in the Iran war

Institution: China-US Focus
Author: Zhang Zhixin (CICIR)
Country · language: China · English
Affiliation: State-affiliated (CICIR)

Summary

Zhang argues that US policy in the Iran war, which began in February 2026, has been driven by improvisation, contradictory messaging and the lack of an exit plan. He contends that even within the administration there is disagreement over the war's aims, and writes that Iran's nuclear and military capabilities serve as deterrence in a region dominated by the US–Israeli military presence, so that Washington has misdiagnosed Iran.

According to the author, the forecast that the war would end by mid-April did not hold; six months on there is no resolution. He sees the options ahead as poor: an interim deal granting Iran de facto control over Hormuz, escalation, or an unsustainable status quo. Zhang points to inconsistent steps such as scaling back exercises in South Korea and putting Oman under pressure over its mediation effort, and argues that depleting munitions stocks and damaged alliance relationships have weakened the US ahead of the November midterm elections. The piece contains no quantitative data; its references to disagreements within the administration could not be independently verified.

Blind spot

What the West misses: Beijing reads the war as a process that drains US global deterrence and munitions capacity, and links it to the Asia-Pacific balance of power. Weakness of this reading: it portrays Iran solely as a defensive actor and leaves China's interest in buying Iranian oil entirely out of the picture.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

Zhang's finding that there is no exit plan matches events on the ground: strikes resumed on 30 August, the Salalah meeting was postponed and Brent approached 108 dollars. Yet portraying Iran as purely defensive is hard to square with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure, and it leaves out China's own interest in Iranian oil. The piece is therefore better read as Beijing's bargaining frame than as a neutral diagnosis. The most likely path is a war of attrition with intermittent strikes and no comprehensive deal before the November midterms.

Likely effects

Energy pricesNegativeWeeks
An unresolved status quo and intermittent strikes are keeping Brent above 100 dollars. The inflation and subsidy burden is rising in Asian and European economies that import oil and LNG.
US deterrence and AsiaNegative6 months+
Depleting munitions stocks and steps such as scaling back exercises in South Korea are deepening doubts among Asia-Pacific allies about US commitment; Beijing uses this in its narrative on the regional balance of power.
US–China bargainingUncertainWeeks
Ahead of the 24 September summit and the truce expiring on 10 November, Beijing sees Washington's predicament in Iran as leverage. This could strengthen China's hand in tariff and truce talks.
TürkiyeNegative1–6 months
A protracted war and high oil prices put pressure on the current account and inflation through the energy import bill, risking a slower decline in annual inflation, which stood at 31.51% in August.

Possibilities, ranked

1
War of attrition without a comprehensive deal50%
Mutual strikes continue intermittently and the Omani channel stays open without producing results; ahead of the midterms the US administration risks neither escalation nor the appearance of concession.
Watch: A new date for the Salalah meeting; frequency of US–Iran exchanges of strikes
2
Escalation30%
Tanker attacks and strikes on Gulf energy infrastructure widen; alternative export routes are also knocked out for an extended period.
Watch: The East-West pipeline staying shut for weeks; the US widening its target set in Iran
3
Interim deal granting Iran a de facto role in Hormuz20%
The temporary corridor agreed with Oman takes effect alongside an arrangement on the blockade; flows partly normalise but Iran's leverage over the strait becomes institutionalised.
Watch: The temporary corridor, entering via Iranian and exiting via Omani waters, actually beginning to operate

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: chinausfocus.com · 7 September 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.