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TALAYINSIGHT

I Geo-Economics & ChokepointsAsia-Pacific

A Reading from Rabat: Cross-Border Payment Infrastructure Is Splitting into Three Blocs

Institution
Policy Center for the New South
Author
Hung Q. Tran
Country · language
Morocco · English
Affiliation
OCP-backed think tank (Rabat)

Summary

The policy brief of 17 September 2026 from the Policy Center for the New South reads cross-border payment infrastructure no longer as a technical question of efficiency but as a geopolitical race in which three separate trading spaces are taking shape. On the China-centred wing, mBridge has moved from 164 transactions and a volume of 22 million dollars in 2022 to 4,000 transactions and 55.5 billion dollars in 2025, with the renminbi's share as the routing currency at around 95%. The withdrawal of the BIS from the project in 2024 shifted the initiative's weight further towards the Chinese side. CIPS has more than 1,700 international members across 190 countries and territories, and its daily transaction volume exceeds 180 billion dollars. China settles up to 60% of its cross-border receipts and payments in renminbi; that share was 10% in 2017. Against this, the renminbi makes up only about 3% of global SWIFT payments and 8% of trade finance; the total commitment under the swap lines the PBoC has established with 40 central banks is around 500 billion dollars.

On the US and G7 side, 28 financial institutions completed real-value transactions on Agora in July 2026; the total amount was 800,000 Swiss francs, roughly 1 million dollars, with an average settlement time of 80 seconds. On Nexus, the third wing, instant payment systems in the 11 BRICS member countries are reported to have carried 10 trillion dollars of transactions over the past 18 months, Indonesia formally joined on 2 February 2026, and Nexus Global Payment was set up in March 2025 to run the scheme. The author also puts numbers on the price of fragmentation: according to the IMF, a loss of up to 7% in global growth over the long run, and since 2022 a fall of roughly 12% in trade and 20% in direct investment between geopolitically distant blocs. The G20 roadmap's target of settling 75% of retail cross-border payments within one hour and bringing the cost below 1% of the transaction amount loses its attainability if this division continues.

The brief's central claim is that the three projects are not replacing one another but growing in parallel: the break with the dollar-centred system is advancing as a gradual multiplication of channels rather than a sudden displacement.

Blind spot

By the brief's measure what counts is volume and transaction numbers; yet the mBridge and Agora figures are at pilot scale and not comparable with SWIFT's daily flow, which can make the rise look faster than it is. The 10 trillion dollars given for Nexus may largely cover domestic rather than cross-border instant payment volume. How capital controls and limits on convertibility set the ceiling for these networks is not addressed; African payment systems are almost entirely absent.

Talay assessment

Bottom line

Payment infrastructure is turning into a power instrument as concrete as tariffs and sanctions, and the division advances through the multiplication of parallel channels rather than a single moment of rupture. mBridge's rise from 22 million dollars to 55.5 billion dollars in a year shows the pace, but the renminbi's roughly 3% share of SWIFT payments says the ceiling is still low. The most likely direction is a multi-layered order in which the dollar system remains the centre while regional channels thicken quickly within their own trading spaces.

Likely effects

  • Sanctions powerNegative1–6 months

    CIPS's more than 1,700 members across 190 countries and its daily volume above 180 billion dollars are gradually eroding the effect of sanctions that rely on closing the dollar channel.

  • Trade costNegative1–6 months

    A 12% fall in trade between blocs and a 20% fall in direct investment already put the price of the split in payment infrastructure on the bill.

  • Mid-sized economiesPositiveWeeks

    Steps such as Indonesia's accession to Nexus open bargaining space for countries that join several channels without tying themselves to a single bloc.

  • Global growthNegative6 months+

    The IMF's estimate of a potential growth loss of up to 7% shows that the price of fragmentation will be paid in real output rather than in financial efficiency.

Possibilities, ranked

  1. 1
    Parallel channels thicken, the dollar stays central55%

    All three projects grow and trade picks its channel by bloc; the renminbi's SWIFT share stays in single digits.

    Watch: The direction of the renminbi's 3% share of global SWIFT payments and its 8% share of trade finance

  2. 2
    The Chinese wing makes a clear jump25%

    mBridge and CIPS volumes move beyond pilot scale and the share of China's cross-border payments settled in renminbi settles above 60%.

    Watch: The level of CIPS's 180 billion dollar daily volume and mBridge's 55.5 billion dollar annual amount in the next reporting round

  3. 3
    Interoperability prevails20%

    Channels are linked around the G20 targets and the division is partly reversed at the level of technical standards.

    Watch: Whether the share of retail cross-border payments settled within one hour approaches the 75% target

Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.

Original publication: policycenter.ma · 17 September 2026

This page summarises the institution's view and does not reflect the view of Talay Insight. No direct quotation is used.