HighIII Kinetic Conflicts & Defence15 September 2026, Tuesday
As the US prepares to withdraw fully from Iraq by 30 September, Iran-backed militias signal they will not hand over their weapons
The remaining hundreds of US troops are being shifted mainly to Jordan. Kataib Hezbollah and Nujaba, meanwhile, refuse to hand over their weapons.
According to an AP report dated 15 September, the US is ending its military presence in Iraq by 30 September. Hundreds of troops and air defence systems in northern Iraq are being moved to other locations in the region, chiefly Jordan. The same date had also been set as the target for disarming non-state armed groups. However, Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada rejected the handover plans. Instead, the groups are demanding that the Peshmerga be brought under control and that Iranian Kurdish opposition groups and PKK bases be removed. A draft understanding cited by Asharq Al-Awsat, meanwhile, envisages fighters joining the Popular Mobilisation Forces by 31 December 2026 and a monitoring process extending to early 2028.
According to the same source, the draft text contains a clause voiding the agreement if war against Iran resumes or an 'existential threat' arises for either party. This is a serious blow to Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's disarmament goal. Analysts warn that the US withdrawal could leave the Kurdistan Region more exposed to militia attacks on energy facilities and public buildings. Weapons remaining in non-state hands directly affect security ties with the Gulf states, northern oil exports via the Ceyhan pipeline and the risk premium on foreign energy investment.
Talay assessment
Bottom line
The US withdrawal from Iraq on 30 September falls on the same date set for disarming the militias; but the refusal by Kataib Hezbollah and Nujaba and the 'existential threat' exemption in the draft understanding indicate that weapons will in practice remain in non-state hands. The most likely course is a paper integration into the Popular Mobilisation Forces with a monitoring process extending into 2028; meanwhile the removal of US deterrence leaves energy facilities in the Kurdistan Region more exposed to attacks.
Likely effects
- Northern Iraqi oil and Ceyhan pipelineNegative1–6 months
The risk of militia attacks on energy facilities in the Kurdistan Region directly threatens northern oil exports via the Ceyhan pipeline and Türkiye's energy transit revenues; the risk premium on foreign energy investment rises.
- Türkiye border securityNegative1–6 months
The militias' demand for the removal of PKK bases makes the PKK issue part of Iraq's disarmament bargaining; the vacuum left by the US withdrawal complicates Türkiye's security calculations in northern Iraq.
- Iraqi state authorityNegativeWeeks
Groups refusing to hand over weapons and the voiding clause in the draft weaken Prime Minister Zaidi's disarmament goal and call into question the central government's monopoly on the use of force.
Possibilities, ranked
- 1Integration on paper60%
The draft understanding is adopted; fighters join the Popular Mobilisation Forces by 31 December 2026 but heavy weapons and command structures are in effect preserved, and low-intensity risk persists.
Watch: Signing of the draft understanding, statements on weapons handover inventories and changes to PMF rosters
- 2Security vacuum and attacks35%
After the US withdrawal, militias step up attacks on energy facilities and public buildings in the Kurdistan Region; northern oil exports are disrupted.
Watch: Reports of drone or rocket attacks on energy facilities around Erbil and Sulaymaniyah and interruptions to Ceyhan pipeline flows
- 3Genuine disarmament5%
Under regional and Iranian pressure the groups begin handing heavy weapons to the state; central government authority strengthens.
Watch: Verified weapons handovers by Kataib Hezbollah or Nujaba and independent monitoring reports
Probabilities are calibrated judgement based on the sources, not measurement, and are revised as new information arrives. Not investment advice.